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FEDERAL MAGISTRATES FOR
THE TRIAL OF PETTY OFFENSES:
NEED AND CONSTITUTIONALITY
GEORE CocimAN Doum t AND LioNFi KESTENBAum
Federal district courts annually hear about 2,000 petty offense cases which
impair their dignity and clutter their dockets. Similar breaches of state
law are generally heard by police and nagistrates' courts, but existing federal
law nakes no provision for a federal magistracy which inight performn the
equivalent function. In this Article, Mr. Doub, Assistant Attorney General
of the United States for the Civil Division, and his co-author and colleague,
Mr. Kestenbamn, argue the desirability, historical propriety, and constitu-
tionality of a proposal to nake the United States commissioner a federal
imagistrate, vested with a general jurisdiction over federal petty offenses.
The directive force of logic has difficulty asserting itself in the
area of judicial administration. Proposed reform in any aspect of the
judicial system is ordinarily accompanied by doubt and hesitation upon
the part of bench and bar. An art devoted to such a substantial extent
to the projection of the past into the present invites adherence to
traditional patterns and a follower of the art retains autochthonous
inhibitions.
The machinery of legal institutions, even more than societal values,
is sustained by this inertia. The discerning legal mind focuses upon
the rightness of decision in the individual case as the proper measure
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of justice. So vast energy is devoted to the evaluation of the decisional
process in cases of national or local interest, while needed repairs in
matters of judicial procedure and administration tend to be left behind
the wall created by the intuitive assumptions of Doctor Pangloss.
In the federal system this wall has been at least interstitially
breached, more by the vigor of the judiciary and scholarly interest than
by the concern of the legislature. Such efforts have produced the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the Federal Rules
of Procedure, the work of the Judicial Conference of the United States
and recent innovations in calendar practice. It cannot be anticipated
that Congress will, for its part, undertake a general reconsideration of
the allocations of federal judicial power, although such a review has not
occurred for more than eighty years.' However, legislative interest in
the efficient administration of the federal trial courts has led to the
recent partial withdrawal of district court jurisdiction in diversity of
citizenship cases.' An appropriate and salutary next step would be an
appraisal of the petty offense business in the federal system and con-
sideration of its elimination from the district court dockets.
Despite sporadic past attempts in this direction, there has been
little evaluation of the wide range and large number of federal petty
offense cases, or the fairness, efficiency and economy of established
processes for disposition of them. Practitioners would concede the in-
congruity of trying petty offenses in the district courts, in view of the
significance of competing matters of judicial concern and the uniform
utilization outside the federal system of summary proceedings before
subordinate magistrates. For that matter the historical difference be-
tween proceedings for minor classes of crimes and serious crimes has
been recognized under the federal and state constitutions. Yet, although
the fact has not been widely publicized, many federal offenders are now
being tried and sentenced, under express statutory authority, by United
States commissioners, serving as federal magistrates, when the offenses
are committed upon federal enclaves.
This development has introduced an incongruity of its own-the
distinction between federal criminal administration relating to offenses
committed in federal areas and those outside them. While occasional
proposals have been bruited to establish a general petty offense juris-
diction in the commissioners, inertia and a basic lack of interest in
1. The present allotment of jurisdiction between the federal and state judiciaries
was essentially established by the Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470, the
assumptions of which underlay the Act of 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552.
z. Pub. L. No. 85-554, 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nmvs 2333, amending 62
Stat. 930, 939 (1948). See Doub, Tine for Re-Evaluatio: Shall We Curtail Diversity
.Trisdiction?, 44 A.B.A.J. 243 (1958).
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minor offenses have been reinforced by doubts as to the constitutionality
of the congressional power to achieve it.
In this Article we propose to analyze the objection that general
federal petty offense tribunals may be incompatible with article III of
the federal constitution, and the reasons for the conclusion that there is
no such barrier. The constitutional problem will, first, be placed in
perspective by an examination of the extent of federal petty offense
business, its burdensome nature, the desirability of the proposal; in
this connection, we will review the existing trial jurisdiction of United
States commissioners and the appropriateness, historically and func-
tionally, of utilizing these officials as federal magistrates.
I. THE NEED FOR A FEDERAL MAGISTRACY
A. The Problem of Federal Petty Offenses
A habitue of the police courts will find a remarkable amount of
familiar business in the administration of federal criminal law. He
may chance upon persons charged with hitchhiking, picking flowers or
disturbing stalactites in national parks,3 or scrawling their names upon
monuments in national cemeteries.' Thousands are caught yearly
violating parking regulations or exceeding speed limits upon federal
roads within the states.3 Each season, hundreds of eager hunters run
afoul of federal law by using grain to entice their birds, by exceeding
the permitted bag, by firing a repeating shotgun which has not been
plugged to reduce capacity to three shells6 or by violating wildlife
refuges.7 Hundreds of "wetbacks" are apprehended for illegal entry.'
Persons may be prosecuted for a wide variety of other minor
infractions, including concealing a letter in a parcel post package 9 or
using a franked envelope; 10 operating an interstate motor carrier
3. The penalty for violation of regulations governing national parks and monu-
ments supervised by the Secretary of Interior is in 45 Stat. 235 (1928), 16 U.S.C.
§3 (1952), those under the Secretary of the Army in 61 Stat. 501 (1947), 16 U.S.C.
§ 9a (1952). The offenses in the text are in 36 C.F.1. §§ 1.2(a), 1.22(b) (1949).
4. REv. STAT. §4881 (1875), as amended, 24 U.S.C. §286 (1952).
5. These are usually state traffic rules which are adopted as federal law by the
Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. §13 (1952). Cf. United States v. Sharpnack,
355 U.S. 286 (1958). For the number of offenders, see note 24 infra.
6. Violation of migratory game regulations is a petty offense under 49 Stat. 1556
(1936), 16 U.S.C. §703 (1952); 53 Stat. 1433 (1939), 16 U.S.C. §704 (1952); 49
Stat. 1556 (1936), 16 U.S.C. § 707 (1952). The offenses in the text are in 50 C.F.R.
§§6.3 (a) - (b), 6.4 (1949). For the number of offenders, see note 56 infra.
7. 18 U.S.C. §41 (1952).
8. 66 Stat. 229, 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (1952). A second offense is a felony, under the
same section. For the number of offenders see note 56 infra.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1723 (1952).
10. 18 U.S.C. § 1719 (1952).
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without certification;" wearing a military uniform of the United
States or a friendly nation,12 or the costume of a letter carrier; 13
destroying Government survey marks; 14 capturing a carrier pigeon; 1r
falsely representing a prediction to be an official federal weather re-
port ' or a blanket to be an authentic Indian product; 17 posing as an
agent or a member of the Red Cross " or of a 4-H club. 9 These and
numerous other crimes 20 are characterized by the Federal Criminal
Code as "petty offenses." Crimes punishable by death or imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year are felonies; other offenses are misde-
meanors; and any misdemeanor punishable by no more than six months'
imprisonment, $500 fine or both is a petty offense.2
Not only comparable minor criminal cases, but ones of far more
importance are deemed beneath the dignity of the state courts of record
and are left to local magistrates or justices of the peace. Indeed, a
"clear and unbroken practice" 22 of centuries in England, the American
colonies and the states has distinguished minor misdeeds and established
summary procedures for their trial before magistrates and without a
jury.' Passing for later discussion the adequacy of the definition of
"petty offenses" in the federal code, there is no doubt of the established
historical and constitutional principle that there is a category of minor
11. 64 Stat. 574 (1950), 49 U.S.C. §306(a) (1952); 63 Stat. 488 (1949), 49
U.S.C. § 322(a) (1952).
12. 18 U.S.C. §§ 702, 703 (1952).
13. 18 U.S.C. § 1730 (1952).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 1858 (1952).
15. 18 U.S.C. §45 (1952).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 2074 (1952).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1159 (1952).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 917 (1952).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 916 (1952).
20. In title 18 itself the following additional sections set forth crimes in the
category of petty offenses: 18 U.S.C. §§42-44, Z44, 489, 701, 704-08, 710, 1157-58,
1232, 1382, 1694-99, 1701, 1713, 1722, 1725-27, 1729, 1731, 1856, 1862-63, 1912, 2195,
2279 (1952). Petty offenses are also found in regulatory acts in other titles, some
of which have already been cited.
21. 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
22. Frandurter & Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guar-
anty of Trial by Jury, 39 HAv. L. REv. 917, 980 (1926).
23. See ibid; 2 HAwKINs, PLEAS OF THE CROWxV 43-69 (16th ed. 1777); PA=EY,
Ss aMARy CoNVICTIONS BY JusTIcEs OF THE PEACE 2-15, 46-50, 340-86 (1866);
McQuILLIN, MUNICIPAL CoaRoRATioNs §§ 1.83, 27.01-03, 27.34 (3d ed. 1949) ; 14 Am.
JuR. Criminal Law § 215 (1938) ; 31 Am. Jun. Justices of the Peace §§ 57, 129 (1958)..
See also District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 624-28 (1937) ; BURN, JUSTICE
OF THE PEACE passim (29th ed. 1845). Addressing the International Congress of
Magistrates and Judges in Rome, Oct. 12, 1958, Sir Lionel Costello stated that non-
paid and nonfee magistrates handle 90% of all criminal cases in England at the
present time.
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crimes collectively designated as "petty offenses," which have been, and
may be, administered upon a different basis from more serious crimes.
Statistics indicating the precise extent of federal petty offense
business are not readily available. However, tens of thousands of cases
are certainly handled annually. In one particularly busy area, in
Maryland and Virginia adjoining Washington, D.C., more than 18,500
petty traffic offenders were apprehended upon federal highways and
areas during the fiscal year 1957-1958 and dealt with through the
federal criminal administration.
24
Although, as shown hereafter, many petty offenses originating
in federal enclaves are being handled by United States commissioners,
petty offenses committed in federal areas where commissioners have not
been appointed to handle them, and all minor offenses committed out-
side the federal areas, must now be tried in the district courts. The
burden of such cases upon the district courts seems an onerous one when
contrasted with their significant work; and it is difficult to escape the
conclusion that the requirement that alleged offenders be tried in a
formal criminal court of record, with or without a jury, may be
oppressive to them.
The historic classification of petty offenses reflects a feeling for
judicial economy and dignity, realization of the disproportionate burden
upon courts, jurors and defendants of handling all crimes upon the same
procedural basis, and a moral judgment distinguishing grave from
petty offenses.' Putting minor offenses into the regular courts would
advantage no one; as a Maryland court noted, it would "not only prove
oppressive in a great many cases to the parties arrested, but it would
24. The traffic violations upon these highways and areas are among the offenses
upon federal enclaves which, as explained in text accompanying notes 33-36 infra,
are now dealt with summarily by about 270 United States commissioners. The
Administrative Office of the United States Courts does not collect statistics for the
total number of cases handled by them. However, inquiries by the Administrative
Office disclosed that the commissioners in Upper Marlboro and Bethesda, Maryland,
and in Alexandria, Virginia, disposed of 3,931, 2,789, and 11,762 petty offenses re-
spectively during the past fiscal year. While no other commissioners are quite as
busy as these three, the Administrative Office states that a large number of petty
offense cases are handled by the commissioners in El Paso and San Antonio, Texas,
San Francisco and Susanville California, and Trenton, New Jersey. Most of these
cases arise on military reservations.
The large figure for the Alexandria commissioner included many parldng vio-
lations on the grounds of the Pentagon Building. The other enumerated cases chiefly
involved traffic offenses upon highways within federal jurisdiction near the Capital-
e.g., George Washington Memorial Parkwvay, part of Baltimore-Washington Parkway,
McArthur Boulevard, Suitland Parkway. See United States v. Dreos, 156 F. Supp.
200 (D. Md. 1957), sustaining the validity of trial by commissioners. The success
of this program is indicated by the congressional proposal last year to enlarge the
commissioners' powers on some of these highways. See note 127 infra.
It is believed that there are now approximately 2,000 petty offenses handled
annually in district courts. See text accompanying note 54 infra.
25. See, e.g., Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 22, at 924, 933, 937, 953-54,
961, 980-82.
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be exceedingly onerous to the public." 2 This is particularly true in
the federal system because the district courts are often inconveniently
remote from the place of the offense. And, federal court trial fre-
quently results in wide publicity entirely disproportionate to a petty
offense, illustrated to the authors' knowledge in migratory game
cases 27 It would certainly be paradoxical if, alone, the federal con-
stitution prohibited petty offenders from choosing speedy, inexpensive
summary trial, and required federal judges to lay aside their weighty
functions in order to perform, with juries, duties equivalent to those of
a local justice of the peace.
In a 1926 article, the historical material as to the development of
the petty offense jurisdiction of local magistrates was comprehensively
reviewed by then Professor Felix Frankfurter and a promising
graduate student. They concluded that an exception for federal petty
offenses was implicit in the constitutional guarantee of trial by jury,
although the modern proliferation of such offenses could not have been
predicted by the framers.28  The Supreme Court has substantiated this
view and, accordingly, even if petty offenses were left to the district
courts, jury trial for them could be abolished, with the achievement of
some measure of expedition.m Indictment by grand jury for such
offenses has not been required since 1930 There has developed no
substantial sentiment in favor of retaining petty offense jurisdiction in
the district courts with a curtailment of jury trials, perhaps in recogni-
tion that such an alteration in district court practice would fail to meet
either the petty offense caseload problem or the realities of the interests
of the offender. Instead, it would appear more logical that efforts be
concentrated upon a more coherent, comprehensive solution-the de-
velopment of separate petty offense tribunals within the federal system.
B. The United States Commissioners as Petty Offense Tribunals
The federal system already contains a group of officials who are
recognized as the obvious choice to preside over petty offense tribunals
-the United States commissioners. Since these officials are appointed
26. State v. Glenn, 54 Md. 572, 605 (1880).
27. While wide publicity is oppressive, the pressure of business in the regular
courts often has the opposite result-a virtual "immunity" to petty offenders, noted
in State v. Glenn, spra note 26, at 605. In the administration of federal prohibition,
this often yielded the so-called "bargain days" for petty offenders in the federal
district courts. Report of the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforce-
inent, H.R. Doc. No. 252, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 9-12, 18 (1930).
28. Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 22, at 975-76 passim.
29. See cases cited note 96 inf ra.
30. See note 48 infra.
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by the district courts at their discretion,"' they can be effectively utilized
to meet the fluctuating needs of petty offense business, an essential
characteristic of any institutional solution. Commissioners have not
only long been "an important feature of the Federal judicial system," 32
but the background and nature of the office demonstrate their particular
appropriateness for the function proposed.
1. More than one-third of the United States commissioners al-
ready have a limited power to dispose of petty offenses. In 1940,
Congress authorized commissioners, who were specially designated by
their appointing district court for that purpose, to try and sentence
persons committing petty offenses in areas within their district over
which the federal government has exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction. 3
Of the 655 commissioners throughout the country, 270 have received
this authority 4
The federal areas covered by the commissioners' existing petty
offense jurisdiction include military reservations, highways, federal
buildings, national parks, memorial parks and cemeteries, thus reaching
a large number of federal petty offense violations. The statute provides
that an offender may elect trial before the district court, and, if tried
31. 28 U.S.C. §631(a) (1952) provides: "Each district court shall appoint
United States commissioners in such number as it deems advisable." Under 28
U.S.C. § 631 (c) (1952), the commissioner's term is for four years unless sooner
removed by the district court.
In addition, 28 U.S.C. §631(a) (1952) authorizes the appointment of a com-
missioner for each of a number of specified national parks, who may also be known
as national park commissioners. See note 45 infra.
32. United States v. Allred, 155 U.S. 591, 594-95 (1895).
33. Act of Oct. 9, 1940, ch. 785, 54 Stat 1058 (now 18 U.S.C. §§ 3401, 3402
(1952)). These sections provide: "Section 3401. Petty offenses; application of
probation laws; fees. (a) Any United States commissioner specially designated for
that purpose by the court by which he was appointed has jurisdiction to try and
sentence persons committing petty offenses in any place over which the Congress has
exclusive power to legislate or over which the United States has concurrent juris-
diction, and within the judicial district for which such commissioner was appointed.
(b) Any person charged with a petty offense may elect, however, to be tried in the
district court of the United States. The commissioner shall apprise the defendant
of his right to make such election and shall not proceed to try the case unless the
defendant after being so apprised, signs a written consent to be tried before the com-
missioner. (c) The probation laws shall be applicable to persons so tried and the
commissioner shall have power to grant probation. (d) For his services in such
cases the commissioner shall receive the fees, and none other, provided by law for
like or similar services. (e) This section shall not apply to the District of Columbia
nor shall it repeal or limit existing jurisdiction, power or authorty of commissioners
appointed for Alaska or in the several national parks.
"Section 3042. Rules of procedure, practice and appeal. In all cases of con-
viction by United States commissioners an appeal shall lie from the judgment of the
commissioner to the district court of the United States for the district in which the
offense was committed. The Supreme Court shall prescribe rules of procedure and
practice for the trial of cases before commissioners and for taking and hearing of
appeals to the said district courts of the United States."
34. These statistics were supplied by the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, Washington, D.C.
19591
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by a commissioner, the offender may appeal to the district court. 5
Under rules promulgated by the Supreme Court, the appeal brings up
errors of law only; trial de novo is barred."
2. The United States commissioner is the counterpart in the
federal system of the subordinate state magistrates and justices of the
peace who have traditionally exercised jurisdiction over petty offenses
and over the preliminary stages of proceedings for more serious
crimes.37  Commissioners were originally established to perform the
latter function and the history of the office attests to the continued recog-
nition of the close parallel between them and the state magistrates.
Under section 33 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, federal offenders
were arrested and imprisoned or bailed for trial by federal judges or
by state magistrates or justices of the peace3 Four years later the
federal circuit courts were authorized to appoint "discreet persons
learned in the law" to take bail. 9 After these officials had acquired the
title of "commissioner" with certain additional authority, Congress
in 1842 authorized them to exercise all the powers of judges and
justices of the peace under this section of the Judiciary Act.4" The
chief duties of the federal commissioners have always lain in this area-
the issuance of warrants for arrest and search, the conducting of
preliminary examinations, commitment of prisoners for trial by the
court in the same or other districts, setting bail, etc.41 Congress con-
35. 18 U.S.C. §3401(b) (1952).
36. Rules of Procedure for Trial Before Commissioners, 18 U.S.C. §3402, rule
4(6) (1952).
37. See note 23.supra.
38. 1 Stat. 91 (1789). The development of the office of the United States com-
missioner was described in United States v. Allred, 155 U.S. 591, 594-95 (1895);
United States v. Maresca, 266 Fed. 713, 719-20, 722 (S.D.N.Y. 1920) ; United States
v. Horn Hing, 48 Fed. 635, 638-40 (N.D.N.Y. 1892).
39. Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 4, 1 Stat. 334.
40. Act of Aug. 23, 1842, ch. 188, 5 Stat. 516. The appointment of such officials
by the district courts, and the title "United States commissioner," dates from 1896.
Act of May 28, 1896, ch. 252, § 19, 29 Stat. 184.
41. FED. R. Cam. P. 3, 4, 5, 40, 41, 46; 18 U.S.C. §3041 (1952). In addition,
these and analogous powers of the commissioners are expressly set forth with respect
to certain specific offenses-e.g., civil rights (62 Stat. 908 (1948), 42 U.S.C. § 1987
(1952) ; 36 Stat 1167 (1911), 42 U.S.C. § 1989 (1952)) ; internal revenue (18 U.S.C.
§ 3045 (1952); INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 7604); migratory game (40 Stat 756
(1918), 16 U.S.C. § 706 (1952); 45 Stat 1224 (1929), 16 U.S.C. § 715 1 (1952);
48 Stat. 452 (1934), 16 U.S.C. §718(f) (1952)); motorboat regulation (54 Stat.
166 (1940), 46 U.S.C. § 526(n) (1952)); commissioners may also hold persons to
security of peace or for good behavior (18 U.S.C. §3043 (1952)). They may
administer oaths, and take bail acknowledgments, affidavits and depositions (28 U.S.C.
§ 637 (1952)).
On the civil side, commissioners may discharge persons imprisoned for debt.
28 U.S.C. § 2007 (1952). In addition, they have been given special authority in
admiralty matters. They may summon the master of a vessel for nonpayment of
seamen's wages and issue process against the vessels. 31 Stat 956 (1901), 46
U.S.C. §§ 603, 604 (1952). Where, by treaty, foreign consular officials in the United
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tinued to delineate commissioners' powers by drawing upon the analogy
of justices of the peace, or by the express adoption of local state law
for their governance.' In recognition of this analogy, several courts
have characterized the commissioners as "justices of the peace of the
United States" and "examining and committing magistrates." 43
Inevitably, Congress began to utilize these "federal magistrates"
to hear and determine minor offenses in certain specific federal areas-
the territories, national parks, and federal highways." This gradual
States have jurisdiction to adjudicate matters involving seamen on foreign vessels,
the commissioners are to exercise their powers of arrest and commitment in aid of
the consular proceedings and are to enforce the award of the foreign consular official.
28 U.S.C. §§257, 258(a) (1952).
In the past, commissioners have been delegated other powers aside from petty
offense jurisdiction, e.g., to arrest and deport aliens. Wong Wing v. United States,
163 U.S. 228 (1896).
42. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 16, 1850, ch. 52, 9 Stat. 458; Act of May 2, 1890, ch.
182, § 39, 26 Stat. 98; Act of March 1, 1895, 28 Stat. 695-96, Reagan v. United States,
182 U.S. 419, 423, 426 (1901) ; Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 786, § 6, 31 Stat. 323; Act of
Sept. 1, 1916. ch. 433, 39 Stat. 693.
43. United States v. Maresca, 266 Fed. 713, 720 (S.D.N.Y. 1920); United
States v. Schumann, 27 Fed. Cas. 984 (No. 16235) (C.C.D. Cal. 1866); Schwartz,
Federal Criminal Jurlsdictimo and Prosecutors" Discretion, 13 LAW & CONTEMP.
PRon. 64, 82 (1948).
The Supreme Court has, in various connections, described commissioners as an
adjunct of the court, possessing independent though subordinate judicial powers,
Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 187 (1902); and as inferior officers of the court, not
judges, subject to the supervision and control of the appointing court at all times,
Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 352-54 (1931) ; United States
v. Casino, 286 Fed. 976, 979-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
Impressed with the judicial quality of the commissioners' work, District Judge
Hough concluded that their issuance and vacating of a search warrant were acts done
in the district court, which could only be challenged on appeal, in the circuit court.
United States v. Maresca, supra. In United States v. Casino, supra, Judge L. Hand
disagreed, analyzing the commissioners' status as subordinate ministerial officers, and
the Second Circuit later sustained the authority of district judges to review acts of
commissioners, supervise and apparently take over matters at any time. In re No. 191
Front St., 5 F.2d 282, 286 (2d Cir. 1924). See Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 369
(1920).
In analyzing and sustaining the commissioners' traditional function, other courts
have observed that they are not judges, nor their powers judicial, in the constitutional
sense. Rice v. Ames, 180 U.S. 371 (1901) ; In re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103, 119
(1852) ; In re Sing Tuck, 126 Fed. 386, 397 (N.D.N.Y. 1903) ; Russell v. Thomas,
21 Fed. Cas. 58 (No. 12,162) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1894). One district judge even said
that commissioners could not constitutionally be clothed with judicial power to hear
and finally determine any matter whatsoever. United States v. Berry, 4 Fed. 779,
780 (D. Colo. 1880). See also Ex parte Doll, 7 Fed. Cas. 854 (No. 3968) (C.C.E.D.
Pa. 1870). In Rider v. United States, 149 Fed. 164 (8th Cir. 1906), and Ex parte
Margrave, 275 Fed. 200 (N.D. Cal. 1921), convictions by commissioners of offenders
in federal reservations were set aside as beyond their statutory powers. There is
nowhere in these cases, however, any explicit discussion of the constitutional problem
treated in the second section of this Article.
44. E.g., territories-Act of May 2, 1890, ch. 182, § 39, 26 Stat. 98; Act of March
1, 1895, 28 Stat. 695-96, Reagan v. United States, 182 U.S. 419, 423, 426 (1901);
national parks-Act of May 7, 1894, ch. 72, § 5, 28 Stat. 74, as amended; Act of June 2,
1920, ch. 218, §§ 7, 8, 41 Stat. 733, as amended; Act of June 30, 1916, ch. 197, § 6, 39
Stat. 245, as amended; Act of April 25, 1928, ch. 434, § 6, 45 Stat. 460, as amended;
Act of Aug. 21, 1916, ch. 368, § 6, 39 Stat. 523, as amended; Act of Aug. 22, 1914, ch.
264, § 6, 38 Stat. 700, as amended; Act of March 2, 1929, ch. 583, § 6, 45 Stat. 1538, as
amended; Act of April 26, 1928, ch. 438, § 6, 45 Stat. 464, as amended; Act of April 19,
1930, ch. 200, § 6, 46 Stat. 228, as amended. Conduit Road in Maryland near Washing-
ton, D.C.-Act of Sept. 1, 1916, ch. 433, 39 Stat. 693 (1916).
1959]
452 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 107
development culminated in the general 1940 statute already referred to,
authorizing commissioners designated by the district courts for that
purpose to try any minor offenses committed within areas of federal
legislative jurisdiction.' It was equally predictable that any substantial
increase in the number of federal petty offenses outside these enclaves
would result in proposals to enlarge the authority of commissioners.
Such proposals developed during federal prohibition, when the
large number of prosecutions of petty offenders caused congestion and
delay in the administration of the federal district courts. The situation
prompted several scholars to urge that petty offenses did not con-
stitutionally require a jury trial." It also led President Hoover's
Wickersham Commission, in 1930, to make the timid recommendations
that petty offenses be prosecuted upon complaint before commissioners,
who would accept pleas, and, if the defendent pleaded not guilty, hold
hearings and recommend conviction or acquittal; the cases would then
be referred to district judges for judgment and sentencing. Such a
measure was proposed in the Congress in 1930 but failed of enact-
ment.
47
Interestingly enough, Congress then did enact a companion measure
recommended by the Wickersham Commission which defined a petty
offense as any misdemeanor the penalty for which did not exceed
imprisonment for six months or a fine of $500 or both, and provided
that such an offense might be prosecuted upon complaint or informa-
tion.48  The definition remained disassociated from the original objec-
45. See note 33 supra and accompanying text. In adopting 18 U.S.C. §§ 3401,
3402 (1952), Congress noted that it was following the precedent of the national parks
and the Conduit Road (see note 44 supra). H.R. REP. No. 2579, 76th Cong., 3d
Sess. 2-3 (1940).
Special United States commissioners for national parks are still authorized to
exercise petty offense jurisdiction within the parks. 28 U.S.C. §§ 631(a), 632 (1952) ;
see note 31 supra. If none is appointed, the same jurisdiction could be vested in a
commissioner for the district. A difference is that park commissioners are paid
salaries, while other federal commissioners receive fees according to the number of
cases and services, with a statutory maximum. 28 U.S.C. §§ 633, 634 (1952).
46. Franldurter & Corcoran, supra note 22.
47. Report of National Commission m Law Observance and Enforcement, H.R.
Doc. No. 252, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 17, 24-25 (1930). The bill to confer jurisdiction
on commissioners was H.R. 9937, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930). Congress sought to
venture further than the Wickersham Commission, which had first suggested vesting
commissioners with jurisdiction only over prohibition petty offenses, although recog-
nizing the desirability of a general petty offense authority. H.R. Doc. No. 252,
supra. As introduced, H.R. 9937 would have covered only "casual or slight violations
of Title II of the National Prohibition Act." In the House Committee, with the
Commission's approval, the quoted phrase was deleted and the general words "petty
offenses" substituted. H.R. REP. No. 1732, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930). The bill
passed the House in that form but was never reported out of the Senate Judiciary
Committee. 72 CONG. REc. 10071, 10094 (1930).
48. Act of Dec. 16, 1930, ch. 15, 46 Stat. 1029. The petty offense definition is
now in 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1952) ; the use of information in lieu of indictment is in FED.
R. CRn. P. 7(a). See Reviser's Note to 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
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tives of the bill until the commissioners' present petty offense juris-
diction was established in 1940.
C. The Desirability of Extending the Commissioners' Existing
Jurisdiction
Although the commissioners' existing power in federal enclaves
covers a majority of federal petty offenses, there is good reason at this
time to essay an extension of jurisdiction beyond the federal areas.
Such an amplified jurisdiction would have, in the first place, a
direct impact upon current proposals that the United States reduce its
authority over the federal enclaves. The existing jurisdiction of com-
missioners is similar to that of police courts which have been created by
Congress in the federal territories and the District of Columbia and are
valid, as we shall see, by reason of the general power of Congress to
govern areas outside the states' boundaries. 9 Similarly, the present
authority of commissioners applies upon areas within the states to
which a federal legislative jurisdiction extends by cession or consent of
the states.""
A bill, proposed in the eighty-fifth Congress and to be reintroduced,
would dilute this constitutional basis. It authorizes, and anticipates,
the relinquishment of federal legislative jurisdiction and retention by the
United States of only a proprietary interest in many areas.5 The bill
proposes, nevertheless, to maintain the commissioners' petty offense
jurisdiction by extending it to offenses committed "in any place
. which is under the charge and control of the United States." 52
The proposal of the Wickersham Commission and its results are reviewed briefly
in Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiclitm and Prosecutor's Discretion, 13 LAW &
CONTEMP. PRoD. 64, 81-82 (1948) ; see Duke v. United States, 301 U.S. 492, 494-95
(1937). See also 72 CONG. REc. 9992, 9993, 10040-71 (1930).
49. See text accompanying notes 87-92 infra and note 92 infra.
50. See notes 33, 45 supra. Congress may "exercise exclusive Legislation" over
the District of Columbia and all places purchased or acquired by consent of the legis-
lature of the state involved. U.S. CoxsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 17.
51. S. 1538, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. J§ 1, 2 (1958). The purpose is to enable states
and local communities to obtain tax revenues; to relieve the federal government from
performing normally local functions; and to assure that residents of the enclaves will
enjoy rights, privileges and services provided by states and localities. Id. § 1.
The bill was favorably reported by the Senate Committee on Government Opera-
tions (S. REP. No. 1278, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958)) and passed the Senate on March
3, 1958. It was later returned by the House upon the Senate's request and no further
action occurred. 104 CoNG. REC. 2838, 2840-43, 4725 (1958). The bill was the fruit
of extensive governmental study (see REPORT OF THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE
FOR THE STUDY OF JUISDICrION OvER FEDERAL AREAS WITHIN THE STATES (1957))
and Attorney General Rogers has announced that he will continue to press for its
early enactment. Address to the 52d Annual Meeting of the National Association
of Attorneys General, Department of Justice Press Release, June 11, 1958, pp. 4-7.
52. S. 1538, supra note 51, §4, amending 18 U.S.C. §3401(a) (1952). See
1 REPORT OF THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF JURISDICTION
OvER FEDERAL AREAS WITHIN THE STATES 75 (1956) ; 2 id. at 142-44 (1957). The
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The validity of the extension may rest upon the connection with federal
property, over which the United States has authority to make "all need-
ful rules and regulations." " But this additional step towards a gen-
eral petty offense system accentuates the desirability of establishing a
constitutional principle sustaining commissioners' jurisdiction regard-
less of the place of the offense.
Aside from this development, the current pressure of petty
offenses unrelated to federal property suggests congressional attention
It is estimated that during recent years an annual average of about
2,000 petty offenses committed outside the federal enclaves were
brought before the district courts."4 This average constitutes six to
eight per cent of all criminal prosecutions in the federal courts,5 but
because of unequal geographical distribution, the burden upon par-
ticular district courts is much more substantial. Thus, migratory game
violations represented ten and one-half per cent to forty-four per cent of
criminal offenders in eight particular districts; 56 and hundreds of petty
"charge and control" standard accords with the language of § 3 of the bill which
authorizes all agency heads (or officials empowered by them) to issue needful rules
and regulations for such areas and fix penalties, not exceeding thirty days' imprison-
ment, $50 fine, or both. Such general power is now exercised only by the Adminis-
trator of General Services. S. REP. No. 1278, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, 12-13 (1958).
53. This language in S. 1538, supra note 51, is derived from art. IV, § 3 of the
federal constitution, authorizing Congress to "make all needful Rules and Regulations
respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States."
54. No complete figures are available for the number of federal prosecutions in
the district courts in the states, which arose outside the federal enclaves and involved
petty offenses as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1952). Criminal cases for the fiscal year
ended 1957, reported by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, include
migratory bird offenses-511 cases, involving 737 defendants; immigration laws-
2,289 cases, involving 2,332 defendants (majority probably petty offenses; see note 56
infra) ; illegal use of uniform-105 cases, involving 103 defendants; motor carrier
violations-316 cases, involving 356 defendants (probably includes substantial number
of petty offenses). ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UmTM
STATES COURTS 213 (1957).
An analysis of cases instituted under a few of the important petty offense pro-
visions in a sample month (November 1957) indicated at least 135 cases. These
consisted of violations of migratory game laws or regulations (49 Stat. 1556 (1936),
16 U.S.C. §§703, 704, 707 (1952); 45 Stat 1225 (1929), 16 U.S.C. §715m
(1952); 48 Stat. 452 (1934), 16 U.S.C. §718g (1952))-50; illegal entry of
aliens, or misrepresentations of facts in such connection, nearly all "wetback" cases
(66 Stat. 229, 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (1952))-50; unlawful entry on military property
(18 U.S.C. § 1382 (1952))-12; unauthorized wearing of uniform (18 U.S.C.
§ 702 (1952))-9; alien crewman wilfully exceeding permit (66 Stat 220, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1282 (1952) )-8; carrier operating without certificate of convenience and necessity
(64 Stat 574 (1950), 49 U.S.C. §306 (1952))-3; sale or possession of imitation
insignia of United States (18 U.S.C. § 701 (1952))-2; nonresident hunting or fish-
ing without license (57 Stat. 306 (1943), 48 U.S.C. § 199 (1952))-1. These
statistics were compiled from the statistical office of the Department of Justice.
55. In the above fiscal year, 26,049 criminal prosecutions of all kinds involving
31,937 defendants were instituted in the federal district courts in the states. ANNuAL
REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES CoURTs 212 (1957).
56. In the fiscal year ended 1957, 511 criminal cases were instituted in the district
courts under the migratory game laws, involving 737 defendants. Of these, 197
offenders were prosecuted in the Eastern District of Louisiana, representing 379o of
all criminal defendants in the district that year; 71 in the District of North Dakota
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offenses under the immigration laws-the so-called "wetback" cases-
were concentrated in the four districts near the Mexican border.
The extent of the present burden of petty criminal cases in the
affected federal districts is presumably reflected in a renewed considera-
tion of a general petty offense authority for commissioners, after of-
fenses within federal enclaves had been covered in 1940. The 1940
legislation inspired studies to that end by the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts and by committees of federal judges at the
instance of the Judicial Conference. 7 The examples of prohibition case
congestion in the 1920's and the "wetback" problem now, also indicate
that in the future other federally enforced programs " might again
magnify the pressure on the district courts and the need for expeditious
handling of petty offenses.
H. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A GENERAL PETTY OFFENSE JURIS-
DICTION OF UNITED STATES COMMISSIONERS
The failure thus far to establish a general inferior offense juris-
diction in commissioners is explicable, in part at least, by past doubt and
irresolution concerning the constitutionality of such a proposal. 9 Since
constituted 44% of all criminal defendants; 63 in the Western District of Louisiana
constituted 24% of all criminal defendants. Other striking figures are for the Northern
District of Iowa, ratio of petty offenders to all criminal defendants-36%; Southern
District of Iowa-29r%%; Southern District of Illinois-18%; District of South
Dakota-15%; District of Maryland-103/%. Id. at 216-18.
Of 2,289 cases instituted under the immigration laws in the fiscal year ended
1957, 1,664 defendants were prosecuted in just four districts-539 in the Southern
District of California, 437 in the Western District of Texas, 380 in the Southern
District of Texas and 308 in the District of Arizona. A high proportion of these
were for the petty offense of illegal entry. Id. at 217-18. Illegal entry, misrepre-
sentation of facts, etc., by a first offender is a petty offense under 66 Stat. 22, 8
U.S.C. § 1325 (1952). Precise statistics as to this category of petty offenders are
unavailable because the Administrative Office does not distinguish petty offenses from
other misdemeanors and felonies in its report of prosecutions instituted under the
immigration laws.
57. The Administrative Office reported to the Judicial Conference in September
1942; the two committees of judges reported in 1943 and 1944. The committee
reporting in 1943 gave specific attention to a suggested amendment to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3401 (1952), which would have added the following: "And any United States
Commissioner so specially designated for said purpose shall also have jurisdiction
to try, and, if found guilty, to sentence persons charged with other federal petty
offenses against the law, or rules and regulations made in pursuance of law, com-
mitted within the judicial district for which such Commissioner was appointed, which
latter petty offenses are specifically or by general classification designated in the
order of court giving such authority to said commissioners." These reports are
unpublished. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF TaE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF Tm
ANNUAL MEETING 12 (1942); id. at 3, 11-14 (1943); id. at 16-17, 22 (1944).
58. A recent study of the legal implications of a possible future federal policy,
i.e., international arms control and inspection, adverted to the status of the com-
missioners' petty offense jurisdiction in the course of a discussion of the constitutional
problems involved in establishing tribunals to try violators of disarmament regulation.
HENKlN, AE3s CoNmoL AND INsPECTION IN AmEmCA LA-w 243 r49 (1958).
59. In connection with some analyses of the proposed "legislative courts" (see
pp. 460-67 infra), it has been assumed, without discussion, that only courts meeting
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there is now no constitutional obstacle to the elimination of trial by jury
for petty offenses,6 the remaining doubt relates solely to the tenure
provisions of the Constitution. Article III, section 1 of the Con-
stitution vests "the judicial power of the United States" in one Su-
preme Court and such inferior courts as Congress may establish and
provides that the judges of these courts shall hold office during good
behavior and, while in office, their compensation may not be reduced.
The question is whether this provision bars trial and judgment of petty
offenders by United States commissioners, who hold office for fixed
terms of four years and are removable at the pleasure of the appointing
courts."1
An analysis of this constitutional objection to the proposed com-
missioners' petty offense jurisdiction indicates that it does not con-
stitute a barrier to the accomplishment of this salutary step. The
historical background of the "good behavior" provision supports such a
distinct treatment of petty offenses, and review upon appeal to the dis-
trict courts would provide for a sufficient exercise of judicial power to
satisfy article III.
A. Historical Limitation of Good Behavior Tenure
It can be demonstrated that "good behavior" tenure and guar-
anteed salary, while considered essential to the independence and in-
tegrity of judges, was never believed by the drafters of the Constitution
to extend to subordinate magistrates who had the power to try petty
offenses.
In The Federalist No. 78, Hamilton urged the tenure provision
as an excellent barrier to oppression and the best expedient for a steady,
upright, and impartial administration of the laws. He pointed to its
importance in Great Britain and noted that article III thereby con-
formed "to the most approved of the State constitutions." 62 This was,
the conditions of article III could try and decide criminal cases. HART & WECESLER,
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 313 (1953); Katz, Federal Legislative
Courts, 43 HARv. L. REv. 894, 916 n.106 (1930). See also United States v. Berry,
4 Fed. 779, 780 (D. Colo. 1880).
In their reports to the Judicial Conference, the committees of judges adverted to
constitutional difficulties but expressed no opinion, while the Director of the Ad-
ministrative Office of the United States Court stated the conclusion that the com-
missioners' petty offense jurisdiction would be constitutional. See note 57 supra. In
the proposal by President Hoover's Wickersham Commission, see text following
note 46 supra, it was sought to avoid this problem by leaving judgment and sentencing,
considered the strictly "judicial" powers, to the district courts.
60. See text accompanying notes 28-29 supra, notes 79-81, 96 infra.
61. 28 U.S.C. § 631(c) (1952).
62. For other contemporaneous references to life tenure of judges in the states
and England during discussion of the federal constitution, see 2 RECORDS OF THE
FEDEaL CONVENTION 428-29 (Farrand ed. 1911); 2 Eim0T'S DEBATES 480.
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in short, one of the rights of Englishmen, the abrogation of which had
been protested in the Declaration of Independence,' to be restored in
the new nation.
In the English statutes, the phrase "during good behavior" first
appeared, in the Latin equivalent, in the Act of Settlement of 1700, pro-
viding that "judges' commissions shall be made quamdiu se bene
gesserint." " In 1760 the good behavior tenure was further protected
and made to survive the death of the Sovereign.' However, this un-
conditional protection for "judges" was never considered applicable to
justices of the peace. It existed alongside the continuing practice of
appointing justices of the peace, to hold office "during the King's
pleasure" and to have jurisdiction to try inferior offenses in summary
proceedings without a jury; and the two tenures are described-by
Blackstone, for example-without any consciousness of inconsistency.6
The same distinction is evident in the practice of the colonies,
67
and later in the state constitutions to which Hamilton referred. At the
time of the federal constitutional convention, each of the states had
adopted a constitution, except Connecticut and Rhode Island; and all
the constitutions other than those of Georgia and New Jersey provided
tenure during good behavior for judges.6 ' Yet none of these documents
provided equivalent protection for justices of the peace.
While some of the constitutions explicitly defined a difference
in tenure between justices of the peace and judges, apparently treating
both as judicial officers,69 others did not. Virginia's Constitution pro-
vided life tenure for judges of specified courts, not including the jus-
tices of the peace." Maryland expressly provided life tenure for "all
63. Among its list of specific complaints, the Declaration stated that the King
had "made judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices and
the amount and payment of their salaries."
64. 12 & 13 Will. 3, ch. 2.
65. 1 Geo. 3, ch. 23.
66. 1 BLACKSTONE, CommENTARIEs * 267-68, 353; 4 id. at * 281-82.
67. Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra iote 22.
68. See 1 Poore, CoNsTrruTIoNs AND CaARmTs 275 (Del.), 819, 826-27 (Md.),
960, 968 (Mass.); 2 id. at 1283, 1290 (N.H.), 1336 (N.Y.), 1412 (N.C.), 1552 (Pa.),
1619, 1625, 1631-32 (S.C.), 1911 (Va.).
Georgia adopted "good behavior" tenure in its 1798 constitution. 1 id. at 393-94.
Pennsylvania had not provided it in the 1776 constitution, but adopted it in 1790.
See 2 id. at 1545.
69. The constitutions of Delaware, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New
York provided for specified terms of years for justices of the peace. 1 id. at 275,
969; 2 id. at 1295, 1337. North Carolina and Pennsylvania provided commissions for
justices of the peace during good behavior, but qualified this by permitting removal
for additional causes not stated for judges or upon request of the legislature. 2 id.
at 1413, 1553. Similarly, see Kentucky's 1792 constitution. 2 id. at 662.
70. 2 id. at 1191. Despite the absence of constitutional or statutory requirement,
the practice apparently developed in Virginia of granting justices of the peace life
tenure. DAvis, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW 5 (1838).
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judges" in its Constitution and Declaration of Rights; while its con-
stitution mentions justices of the peace in another context, we must look
to a contemporary handbook to ascertain that these officials had only
fixed one-year terms.71
South Carolina presents the most striking situation. Its con-
stitutions of 1776 and 1778 stated that justices of the peace should hold
office during pleasure, all other judicial officers during good behavior.
In 1790 a new constitution was adopted with phraseology modeled on
article III of the federal constitution-vesting judicial power in su-
perior and inferior courts, the judges of which shall hold their com-
missions during good behavior.7' No mention was made of subordinate
magistracies or justices of the peace. Nevertheless, the following year
the legislature provided for justices of the peace to hold office for
terms of four years, and to hear and determine all matters theretofore
within the competence of the office.'3
It is evident that the desirability of a commission "during good
behavior" was not, at that time, believed to be applicable to inferior
magistrates, and that the term "judges" or "judicial power," when
used in connection with such tenure provision, did not include such
officials.7 4 So the federal constitution, incorporating this language, did
not give new scope to the life tenure requirement for the disposition of
criminal cases; it reaffirmed existing practice.
71. 1 Pooas, op. cit. supra note 68, at 819, 826-27; CoLVIN, MAGISTRATE'S GuIDE
& CITIZEN'S COUxSELOR 336 (1819).
72. 2 PooaR, op. cit. supra note 68, at 1619, 1625, 1631-32.
73. An Act To Amend the Several Acts for Establishing County Courts, etc.,
Feb. 19, 1791, in Acts of the General Assembly of South Carolina Ratified in Feb.
1791, at 25, 27.
74. This point is strikingly illustrated in a number of state cases, e.g.: Shafer
v. Mumma, 17 Md. 331 (1861), holding that the state constitution's vesting of
"judicial power" in certain officers did not preclude a mayor, in whom no such
power was vested, from adjudging the guilt of a prostitute under a local ordinance
and imposing a fine. Such control of the public peace and morals was held to be
part of the police power as distinguished from the regular judicial powers of the
state; this distinction had been observed from time immemorial in this country and
in England. Id. at 336. People ex rel. Burgess v. Wilson; 15 Ill. 388 (1854),
holding that a constitutional provision establishing citizenship and residence require-
ments for "the office of judge of any court of this state" did not apply to justices of
the peace or to a municipal recorder's court State v. Young, 3 Kan. 445, 448-49
(1866), upholding the jurisdiction of municipal courts to try violations of ordinances
governing the sale of intoxicating beverages, on the ground that such power was
not part of the "judicial power" vested by the Organic Act in other specified courts.
See also Sill v. Village of Coming, 15 N.Y. 297, 300-01 (1857). The Richmond
Mayoralty Case, 60 Va. (19 Gratt.) 673, 714-15 (1870), deciding that the word"court" in the transitional provisions of Virginia post-Civil War constitution, re-
ferred to courts of record organized under the judiciary article, not to a mayor's
court. Forbes v. State, 18 Del. (2 Pennewill) 197, 43 Atl. 626 (1898), holding
that transitional provisions continuing until a specified date "all the courts of justice
now existing . .. and the chancellor and judges" then in office did not apply to
inferior tribunals-justices of the peace or municipal courts.
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B. Article III and the Due Process Aspect of Commissioners' Courts
This historical background of the tenure provision serves to
suggest the inapplicability of the recent decisions in Reid v. Covert "
and United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles " concerning military courts,
and other discussions emphasizing what might be called the due process
aspect of tenure during good behavior, i.e., the significance of the inde-
pendent life tenure judge, along with the jury, as a right in the federal
scheme of criminal trials.77
Since due process requirements refer us to those settled common-
law practices which were accepted and espoused in the Colonies,78 the
language in the recent cases may not be taken to extend to petty of-
fenses. As we have seen, these were traditionally dealt with by magis-
trates without life tenure, and the safeguards of trial before a judge
holding office during good behavior were not considered necessary.
Indeed, a special status for petty offenses was noted by the Supreme
Court in another case involving military tribunals. In Ex parte
Quirin,2 the Court pointed to the distinction between petty offense
matters and ordinary criminal prosecutions requiring trial by jury to
illustrate the fact that, by necessary implication, the panoply of con-
stitutional safeguards does not apply to certain proceedings from which
they had traditionally been excluded."
But just as a jury trial is not historically-hence not constitu-
tionally-an attribute of due process for petty offenses,8 ' so neither is
trial before a judge holding office during good behavior. To the ex-
tent, therefore, that the provision of a life tenure judiciary embodies a
condition of federal due process, the requirement would not be ap-
plicable to petty offenses and would not preclude the vesting of juris-
diction over such offenses in United States commissioners.8
75. 354 U.S. 1 (1956).
76. 350 U.S. 1 (1955).
77. In Reid and Toth the Court stressed this significance of the article III court,
along with the civilian jury, when it invalidated the extension of court-martial juris-
diction to discharged servicemen, and to dependents of servicemen in encampments
overseas. 354 U.S. at 21, 36; 350 U.S. at 17-19; see also Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) 2, 121-22 (1866). The same approach is indicated in Hamilton's obser-
vations in text accompanying note 62 supra.
78. Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.)
272, 279 (1855); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 100 (1908).
79. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
80. 317 U.S. at 39-40. In Reid v. Covert, it may be noted, Justices Frankfurter
and Harlan limited their concurrence to capital offenses. 354 U.S. at 45, 65.
81. See cases cited note 96 infra.
82. At most, the due process side of good behavior tenure represents a preferred
element in federal criminal administration. Like the exclusion of evidence uncovered
in an unreasonable search, it is not applicable to state proceedings; and the abandon-
ment by the states of life tenure for their judiciaries does not present a question
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This conclusion is particularly significant because the famous case
of Wong Wing v. United States,' striking down the imposition of
criminal punishment by a commissioner, turned wholly upon a due
process point. Congress had authorized commissioners to adjudicate
and order deportations of Chinese; if the commissioners found them
unlawfully in the United States, the commissioners were authorized
to imprison them at hard labor. The Court sustained deportation
ordered by a commissioner but held the sentence of imprisonment at
hard labor to be unconstitutional as an "infamous punishment," only
imposable after indictment by grand jury, jury trial, etc. Wong Wing
thus confirmed the inviolability of the usual criminal procedures 84 but
does not stand for any constitutional requirement that all crimes, in-
cluding petty offenses, must be adjudicated by a judge holding office
during good behavior. Indeed, in a subsequent case, the Court ex-
plicitly declared that Wong Wing depended entirely upon the infamous
nature of hard labor and implied that imprisonment without hard labor
could have been imposed by the commissioner.'
C. Article III and the Power of Congress To Establish the Proposed
Jurisdiction of Commissioners
Aside from its due process aspect may article III's assignment of
judicial power to a judiciary with life tenure be considered as a limita-
tion upon the power of Congress to establish courts? This approach
brings us to the learning distinguishing between constitutional and
so-called "legislative" courts, which is pertinent to the legal problem
here.8 6
The Supreme Court has held that Congress may establish
"legislative courts," i.e., courts not complying with article III, in two
situations-(1) to exercise jurisdiction in territories not within the
under the fourteenth amendment Furthermore, since even federal courts outside
the states, e.g., in the territories, may concededly be staffed by judges with fixed
terms, it is clear that life tenure does not have the dignity of other elements of due
process-e.g., independence of the tribunal, right to counsel and cross-examination-
which may be required in federal criminal courts wherever located. Cf. Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-10, 44-45, 64, 75 (1956).
83. 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
84. Some of these, like indictment, jury trial, would not apply to petty offenses.
See text accompanying notes 28-30 supra.
85. United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433, 439-40 (1922), involved a pro-
ceeding in the District of Columbia Juvenile Court for wilful neglect to support
minor children, a misdemeanor punishable by $500 fine, or twelve months in hard
labor at the District of Columbia workhouse, or both. The Court held that hard
labor-whether in reformatory or jail-constituted infamous punishment and required
indictment by grand jury.
86. See note 59 supra.
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jurisdiction of the states; 11 and (2) to decide civil matters, arising be-
tween the Government and others, e.g., claims against the United
States, which do not constitutionally require judicial determination and
yet are susceptible of it." These tribunals rest upon constitutional
authority other than article III "' and hence, although incapable of the
receipt of the judicial power referred to in article III, they are also free
of its conditions. They may, therefore, be staffed with judges who hold
office for terms of years, and whose compensation may be reduced; "
they may be required to render advisory opinions and to decide matters
which do not qualify as "cases" or "controversies." 91
It may be suggested that these authorities, by implication, exclude
any exception to article III other than the two categories mentioned.
Thus, since legislative courts may be established outside the jurisdiction
of the states, Congress can validly authorize commissioners to try petty
offenses committed in federal enclaves. 2  As to federal offenses com-
mitted in the states, the point may be made that no similar tribunals
can be created, for article III is the sole basis for federal court juris-
diction over them; and "judges appointed to administer them must
possess the constitutional tenure of office before they can become
invested with any part of the judicial power of the Union." '3
Analogizing the second category of legislative court jurisdiction,
it may be argued that, in the states, Congress has validly given United
States commissioners only such functions as do not require judicial
determination,94 but criminal punishment, even of a minor nature, can-
not be inflicted without judicial proceedings and the only judicial
87. American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1928); Benner v.
Porter, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 235, 244 (1850); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 266
(1901).
88. Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929) ; Williams v. United States,
289 U.S. 553 (1933).
89. The legislative courts involved in the above cases are sometimes called
"article I courts," since the legislative power of Congress provided in that article
was relied upon. However, as a recent study has noted, tribunals free of the require-
ments of article III may also be established under other constitutional powers. Thus,
the territorial courts are sustainable under Congress' authority over territories, set
forth in article IV, § 3 (see cases cited note 87 supra); and courts established by
the President in occupied territory were upheld under his authority as commander-
in-chief in article II, Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952) ; HEN iN, op. cit. supra
note 58, at 242-43 n.49.
90. American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828) ; Williams v.
United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933).
91. See Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929).
92. The validity of the police courts in the territories and the District of Columbia
has plainly been assumed by the Supreme Court. See Schick v. United States,
195 U.S. 65, 71 (1904); Reagan v. United States, 182 U.S. 419, 423, 426 (1901);
Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 555-57 (1888).
93. See Benner v. Porter, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 235, 244 (1850); American Ins.
Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828) ; Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244,
266 (1901).
94. For such powers, see note 41 supra.
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proceeding available under the Constitution is before a life tenure
judge. Thus, assuming that the drafters of the Constitution would
have provided federal magistracies without life tenure for petty
offenses, had they foreseen the present situation, is there room for
implied authority in Congress to create them? "
The argument above rests upon a twofold premise-that the
"judicial power" vested in article III comprehends all criminal pro-
ceedings, and excludes the possibility of distinction between petty
offenses and others; and that the vesting of judicial power in article III
courts requires the entire process of federal adjudication to be carried
out before such courts. Despite supporting dicta in the legislative court
cases, a less superficial analysis indicates that neither of these inferences
is warranted.
As to the first assumption, the Supreme Court has recognized the
historical basis warranting special treatment of petty offenses, and
read it into another portion of article III. In excluding petty offenses
from the guarantee of trial by jury, the Court not only distinguished
the sixth amendment, but also dealt with the explicit requirement of
article III, section 2 that "the trial of all crimes shall be by jury." It
deferred to the traditional procedures and held that "crimes" in article
III does not include petty offenses. 6
In the same way, the inapplicability to petty offenses of life tenure
as a due process concept should carry over to the construction of article
III, section 1. Here, we are also aided by the ample historical evi-
dence, already reviewed, that the term "judicial power" did not com-
prehend the disposition of petty offenses9 7
The interpretation of "judicial power" in light of the historical
material is established by a second line of authorities under article III-
those concerning the grant of jurisdiction over federal crimes to the
95. This argument could be buttressed by evidence from the drafting of the
Constitution. It was apparently believed that, without the provision for "inferior
courts," state courts would be used for federal business and the Supreme Court would
be the only federal court-leaving no implied power to create United States mag-
istracies. 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 124-25, 172, 205-07 (Farrand ed.
1911); Warren, Federal Criminal Law and the State Courts, 38 HARV. L. REv. 545,
546-47 (1925). But see note 103 infra.
If this view were accepted, the exercise by commissioners of the proposed general
petty offense jurisdiction would not be saved by the waiver of the accused. Since a
limitation upon the power of Congress is involved, such waiver would appear irrele-
vant. Cf. McClaughry v. Deming, 186 U.S. 49, 65-69 (1902) ; Rider v. United States,
149 Fed. 164, 165 (8th Cir. 1906); Ex parte Margrave, 275 Fed. 200 (N.D. Cal.
1921).
96. District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937); Schick v. United
States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904). See Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 557 (1888);
District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 72-73 (1930) ; see text accompanying notes
28-29, 60, 79-81 supra.
97. See pp. 456-58 supra, especially text accompanying notes 72-74 and note 74
supra.
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state courts. It was originally believed, by Justice Story and others,
that state court jurisdiction over federal crimes was barred by article
III.8 This was felt to be required by the Constitution's parallelism
which extended "judicial power" to "all cases" of federal crimes
(article III, section 2) and "vested" the identical power only in courts
created under article III, section 1. Significantly, the same view
underlies the development of the concept of "legislative courts" in
American Ins. Co. v. Canter 11 and may be found in later opinions
which appeared to prejudice the utilization of commissioners for the
handling of petty offenses.3'0
Here again, the Supreme Court has ultimately come to look not
to the bare mandatory words of article III, but to the historical evi-
dence-the contemporary understanding that the state courts were a
natural alternative channel for the execution of federal laws. It now
seems clear that jurisdiction over federal crimes and other federal
causes of action can be vested in the state courts; 101 and, incidentally,
that no constitutional infirmity would be presented by the fact that
states generally do not now have any life tenure requirement even for
judges of their courts of record.0 2 Similarly, the accepted traditional
difference between petty offenses and serious crimes belies identical
treatment and broadly supports disposition of petty offenses in the
customary manner by subordinate magistrates without life tenure.
Although susceptible of determination in the regular federal courts,
jurisdiction over petty offenses may also be vested in other tribunals,
whether state or federal. And Congress can create the necessary
"legislative courts," in the form of the proposed commissioner-magis-
98. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304, 330-37 (1816); 2
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSnTITION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 1748-56,
especially 1756. The authority of state magistrates to arrest and commit federal
offenders was then considered sustainable only on the ground that these were not
judicial powers but only incidental to them. See Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S.
275, 278-80 (1897) ; see note 43 supra. Robertson refers to the magistrates' authority
as "such power as is ordinarily given to officers of courts not of record." Robertson v.
Baldwin, supra at 279. Courts run by the United States commissioners would be courts
not of record subordinate to the federal district courts.
99. 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828). In Canter, the Court sustained a decree in
admiralty rendered by a Florida territorial court. It apparently agreed with the
appellant's contention that under article III the decree would be invalid since the
"judicial power" involved in "all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" had
to be vested in a regular federal court. 26 U.S. at 528-30, 546. Consequently, in
holding that a constitutional power other than article III had been exercised by
Congress, the Court assumed that no such situation could arise within the states.
100. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 566-67 (1933), and the
case there relied upon, Levin v. United States, 128 Fed. 826 (8th Cir. 1904).
101. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947); Warren, Federal Criminal Law
,oid the State Courts, 38 H.Aazv. L. Ra. 545, 546-54, 570-80 (1925).
102. Cf. Minneapolis & St. L.R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916). See
note 82 sura.
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trates, under its authority to make all laws "necessary and proper"
to carry out other delegated powers."0 3
Alternatively, even if the petty offense tribunals are deemed to
exercise federal "judicial power," i.e., to be included among "such
inferior courts" as Congress may create under article III, the his-
torical evidence shows that these particular tribunals do not have any
"judges" to whom the Constitution's requirement of "good behavior"
tenure applies .' 4  In this view, although the petty offense tribunals are
article III courts, they may nevertheless be presided over by subordinate
judicial officers, not judges, because of the nature of their juris-
diction. Congress can therefore authorize the appointment of com-
missioner-magistrates, as in the case of referees in bankruptcy, and
may establish appropriate tenure provisions for them without any
constitutional infirmity.
As to the second assumption, that the full process of adjudication
must be in constitutional courts, it appears that the exercise of federal
judicial power over petty offenses by a process of review will satisfy the
requirements of article III, even if it were deemed applicable to such
offenses.
The alternatives of an original proceeding or review in the federal
courts have always been recognized. Thus, while Martin v. Hunter's
103. In American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828), the
Court held that the territorial courts were validly established pursuant to Congress'
express power over the territories (U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3) or "in virtue of the
general right of sovereignty which exists in the government." Use of a similar residual
authority is here indicated.
The history of the Constitutional Convention supports the conclusion that the
extent of federal jurisdiction, defined in article III,§ 2, should be considered apart
from the extent to which such jurisdiction must be placed in the regular federal
courts, i.e., vested under article III, § 1. The early drafts proposed and agreed upon
contained two separate clauses--"that a national judiciary be established ... ";
and, "that the jurisdiction of the national judiciary shall be . . . ." 1 REcoRDs OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 21-22, 28, 95, 223-24, 226, 230-33, 244 (Farrand ed. 1911) ;
2 id. at 132-33, 146-47, 157. The introduction of the parallel language of "judicial
power" in both clauses took place in the Committee on Detail. 2 id. at 172-73, 186,
575-76. There is nothing to indicate any objective other than a stylistic one, to make
the language correspond to the vesting of legislative and executive powers in the
previous articles, and thus to carry out the terminology of the proposed introductory
article II: "The Government shall consist of supreme legislative, executive and
judicial powers." 2 id. at 163, 177, 565.
See also the opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson in National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tide-
water Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949), considering article I as a source of judicial
power for federal courts in the states.
104. This approach is suggested by the decisions under state constitutions which
have sustained minor offense tribunals as covered by a residual legislative power to
establish "other courts," or "other inferior courts" (e.g., Gray v. State, 2 Del. (2
Harr.) 76, 89-91 (1833); State v. Dreger, 97 Minn. 221, 106 N.W. 904 (1906);
Corey v. State, 28 Tex. Ct. App. R. 490, 13 S.W. 778 (1890)), and by People ex rel.
Burgess v. Wilson, 15 11. 388 (1854), distinguishing between such power to create
courts and the tenure applicable and holding that the minor tribunals were not in-
cluded in a tenure provision covering "the office of judge of any court." See note 74
supra. The historical evidence that the officers presiding over petty offense tribunals
are not "judges" for the purpose of life tenure is set forth at pp. 456-58 supra.
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Lessee 105 erroneously assumed that federal crimes could not be tried
in state tribunals, its holding was that federal matters which may be
considered by state courts must be reviewed by the federal courts
precisely in order that the requirements of article III be satisfied.
Although this question has never been raised in the criminal area,
the vesting of jurisdiction in administrative tribunals presented similar
constitutional arguments. Just as the appellant in American Ins. Co. v.
Canter contended that admiralty matters must be decided by con-
stitutional courts and the decree of a territorial court was void,106 so
the respondent in Crowell v. Benson 107 urged that article III barred the
decision of an admiralty case by the federal administrative tribunal
created by the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act.
In Crowell v. Benson, the Court decided that it was not necessary,
in order to maintain the essential attributes of judicial power, that
determinations of fact in constitutional courts be made by judges, and
sustained the use of an administrative officer subject to review by the
court.108 However, article III's provision that the judicial power
extended to admiralty cases did require that the existence of admiralty
jurisdiction be ultimately determined by a federal court; hence, it was
held, on those issues review in court must be by trial de novo.'0 9
Justices Brandeis, Stone and Roberts dissented, believing that even as
to the latter issue review upon the administrative record was sufficient.
It is thus apparent that article III can be satisfied on the civil side
by provision for judicial review-if necessary, amounting to trial de
novo. This was the assumption of both majority and dissent. 110
Indeed, the dissenting justices (opinion by Brandeis, J.) went further
and flatly asserted that article III's "judicial power" never of itself
requires trial by a federal constitutional court; this is solely a matter of
due process:
105. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 141 (1816).
106. See note 99 supra.
107. 285 U.S. 22 (1932). The respondent's arguments are set forth in 285 U.S.
at 32-36.
108. 285 U.S. at 48-54. The Court first noted that compensation claims under
the act presented civil cases between private parties and were wholly unlike claims
against the United States which did not require exercise of article III power and
could be confined to legislative courts. 285 U.S. at 50-51. This demonstrates the
Court's awareness that the challenged proceeding had to satisfy article III.
109. 285 U.S. at 54-65.
110. Moreover, this lesson of Crowell v. Benson is not affected by subsequent
doubts that the majority's requirement of trial de novo is still good law. Schwartz,
Does thw Glwst of Crowell v. Benson Still Walk?, 98 U. PA. L. REV. 163 (1949);
Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson: Judicial Review of Administrative Determinations of
Questions of "Constitutional Fact," 80 U. PA. L. REv. 1055 (1932).
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"There is in that Article nothing which requires any controversy
to be determined as of first instance in the federal district courts.
The jurisdiction of those courts is subject to the control of Con-
gress. Matters which may be placed within their jurisdiction
may instead be committed to the state courts. If there be any
controversy to which the judicial power extends that may not be
subjected to the conclusive determination of administrative bodies
or federal legislative courts, it is not because of any prohibition
against the diminution of the jurisdiction of the federal district
courts as such, but because, under certain circumstances, the con-
stitutional requirement of due process is a requirement of judicial
process." 1
Turning to federal criminal procedures, it seems clear that, in
the prosecution of serious crimes, due process would not be satisfied by
merely an eventual interposition of article III's judicial process, but
rather requires a constitutional court from the start as it does a jury
from the beginning. The Supreme Court has held that, as to major
criminal offenses, a summary proceeding with later appeal to a trial by
jury does not satisfy the guaranteed right to such trial."2 However,
the Court clearly distinguished petty offenses, stating that appeal to a
jury would be sufficient. The inference follows that trial by commis-
sioner with the right to review in the district court would also represent
a "judicial process" consistent with due process," 8 and hence would meet
the demands of article III as well as of the sixth amendment. Pre-
cisely this kind of trial was approved as "judicial" in the immigration
field, in the leading case of Ng Fung Ho v. White."4
Such review by the district court maintains the character of
commissioners as subordinate judicial officers, subject to control and
supervision by the district courts."' The Court's comparison of the
administrative officers in Crowell v. Benson to masters 1. recalls a
similar earlier observation regarding commissioners." 7
Furthermore, such a practice would be consonant with traditional
procedures for the disposition of petty offenses. Since the latter part of
the seventeenth century, trial by magistrate has been subject to appeal
111. 285 U.S. at 86-87.
112. Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888).
113. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 87 (1932).
114. 259 U.S. 276 (1922). The Court there held that due process required a
"judicial trial" of the claim of citizenship made by a person being deported, and
remanded for trial by the district court. But the Court also approved deportation
procedures under another law as "judicial in its nature. It is commenced usually
before a commissioner of the court; but on appeal to the District Court additional
evidence may be introduced and the trial is de iwvo." 259 U.S. at 283.
115. See note 43 supra.
116. 285 U.S. at 51-54.
117. United States v. Allred, 155 U.S. 591, 595 (1895).
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to a regular criminal court of record, where fresh evidence could be
submitted and witnesses re-examined, a new trial usually being af-
forded.' Not only was this historic procedure generally embodied in
the legislation of the states, but, even when such laws trenched upon
offenses for which the state constitutions guaranteed trial by jury, it
was uniformly held that a right of appeal from a conviction to a jury
trial was sufficient, so the initial hearing might be before a magistrate
alone." 9 Such deferred consideration by a federal district court after
a trial by a commissioner should likewise be constitutionally sufficient,
particularly if the district court hearing involves a trial de novo.
III. CoNcLusIoN
The consideration of a substantial constitutional question ordi-
narily involves an appraisal of competing social objectives
soliciting acceptance, qualified by commitments to ends embodied in the
Constitution. However, objection to the proposed petty offense
tribunals is not seriously predicated upon such balancing of values. It
rests upon a supposed absence of power due to the framers' failure to
anticipate federal petty offenses, and upon a reading of the Constitution
which pays scant heed to historical evidence or the actualities of criminal
law administration.
This Article has indicated the fallacy of these objections. Sum-
mary proceedings by subordinate magistrates have traditionally char-
acterized petty offense trials. The provision of life tenure for the
judiciary in the regular courts of record, embodied in article III of the
Constitution, carries an implicit exception for inferior tribunals which
try minor crimes. And any possible demand of article III is satisfied
by provision of review. It may be concluded that there are no sub-
stantial obstacles to the creation of federal petty offense tribunals or
the endowment of United States commissioners with such authority.
118. Franldurter & Corcoran, Petty Federal Offettses and the Constitutional
Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HAa.v. L. REv. 917, 927 (1926); see 1 BuaR, JU TIcE
OF THE PEACz 167 (29th ed. 1845) ; PALEY, SUMMARY CoNvicrioNS BY JUSTICES OF
THE PEACE 12-15, 367-373 (5th ed. 1866) ; 31 Am. JU.L Justices of the Peace § 129
(1958).
119. E.g., City of Des Moines v. Pugh, 231 Iowa 1283, 2 N.W.2d 754 (1942);
Sprague v. Inhabitants of Androscoggin County, 104 Me. 352, 71 Atl. 1090 (1908) ;
Jones v. Robbins, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 329 (1857); State v. Tate, 169 N.C. 373, 85
S.E. 383 (1915) ; Brown v. Epps, 91 Va. 726, 21 S.E. 119 (1895) ; City of Bellingham
v. Hite, 37 Wash. 2d 652, 225 P.2d 895 (1950) ; Vetock v. Hufford, 74 W. Va. 785,
82 S.E. 1099 (1914).
There are numerous such decisions involving the right to trial by jury in civil
cases. E.g., Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1 (1899).
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A conviction as to the constitutionality of this proposal is, no
doubt, allied to the recognition of its desirability which has animated
the historical treatment of petty offenses. The contrary notion that the
Constitution impels federal district courts to act as police courts would
benefit no public or private interest. Despite the commissioners'
existing authority, the present system continues to impose an intolerable
amount of trivial criminal business upon the district courts to the pre-
judice of their dignity and of their significant work. The power
vested in commissioners to hear and determine petty offenses com-
mitted in federal areas and the jurisdiction of the district courts to try
federal petty offenses committed in state areas are distinguishable only
upon the basis of the locus of the act involved, not by reason of the
quality or significance of the offenses. Indeed, many offenses tried in
the district courts, such as violations of migratory game regulations of
the Federal Fish and Wild Life Service, seem more inconsequential
than offenses handled by the commissioners.
The paucity of appeals from state magistrates to courts of record,
as well as the insignificant number of appeals to the district courts from
judgments of commissioners under their existing petty offense juris-
diction, testifies to the widespread preference of the public for summary
disposition of such offenses.'" Experience over several centuries with
summary procedures for the handling of trivial offenses makes ap-
parent that, however valuable trial before courts of record, upon indict-
ment or information with or without trial by jury, may be to the ac-
cused in the area of serious crimes, these procedures are not beneficial
to the accused but onerous to him when applied to minor offenses.
The adoption of summary proceedings for federal petty offenses
can be achieved, as already indicated, by an extension of the power
already vested in United States commissioners; and no substantial
problems of statutory drafting are likely to be encountered. Thus, no
change is required in the present definition of petty offenses, even
though its sole criterion is the severity of potential punishment-six
months' imprisonment or $500 fine or both.'2 ' When classifying petty
offenses in the District of Columbia, the Supreme Court has held that
the historic treatment of each crime and its moral quality must also be
considered and that even a lesser punishment might characterize a
grave offense, requiring regular jury trial, when it is "of such obvious
120. For example, the United States Attorney for the District of Maryland
advises us that, in that district, only three appeals have been taken from the
judgments of United States commissioners during the last three years. In fiscal
1957 alone, more than 6,700 petty offense cases were disposed of by two commis-
sioners in Upper Marlboro and Bethesda, Maryland. See note 24 supra.
121. 18 U.S.C. §1 (1952).
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depravity that to characterize it as a petty offense would be to shock the
general moral sense." 12 However, these additional factors have only
academic relevance here, for all offenses now in the United States Code
which fall within the petty offense definition appear clearly not to in-
volve any "obvious depravity" and hence may constitutionally be
classed as petty offenses.2
The simplest way to establish a general petty offense jurisdiction
in commissioners would be to amend the present provision by striking
out the condition that the offense be committed within an area of federal
jurisdiction.124 This would present the question whether the present
provision meets the necessities of article III for offenses committed in
the states-whether less than a trial de novo on appeal in the district
court is sufficient, whether an opportunity to elect district court trial is
equivalent to a later trial de novo and whether, in view of such election,
court review of errors of law is sufficient."2 On the other hand, if trial
de novo is made available with respect to the proposed new jurisdic-
tion, 26 it is advisable that the existing procedures for offenses in the
federal areas be left unaltered. A lack of uniformity between treatment
of offenses committed in federal areas and outside them is a small price
for the unimpaired maintenance of the existing expeditious procedures,
without double trials, for the majority of petty federal offenses.'
7
122. District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 73 (1930); see District of
Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 625-30 (1937). Although the sale of second-hand
property without a license, punishable by ninety days' imprisonment or $300 fine,
was classified as petty in the Clawans case, Colts held that reckless driving was
not, notwithstanding a maximum penalty of thirty days or $100, on the theory that
the latter was inalurn in. se, indictable at common law and "of such obvious depravity."
In the 1930 debate upon the Wickersham Commission's proposal, a Congressman
referred to the court decisions and observed that an offense can not be made
petty by calling it so. 72 CONG. Rc. 9992 (1930). See also Frankfurter &
Corcoran, supra note 118, at 977-81.
123. See, e.g., offenses cited notes 3-20 supra.
124. 18 U.S.C. § 3401(a) (1952) is set forth at note 33 supra. The words
to be struck are those italicized as follows: "try and sentence persons committing
petty offenses in any place over which the Congress has exclusive power to legislate
or over which the United States has concurrent hurisdiction, and within the judicial
district for which such commissioner was appointed."
The bill now pending which would extend the commissioners' petty offense
jurisdiction to properties under the control of the United States seeks to amend
§ 3401(a) by the addition of another place to those in the italicized phrase. See
note 52 supra.
125. The appeals to district courts from commissioners' trials are governed by
the rules established by the Supreme Court. Rules of Procedure for Trial Before Com-
missioners, 18 U.S.C. § 3402, rule 4(6) (1952).
126. See text accompanying notes 110-19 supra. While the privilege of trial de
novo in the district courts seems desirable, the new legislation should not (and need
not) make such a full hearing mandatory since a less extensive district court hearing
may suffice for limited factual issues.
127. The modem tendency has been to restrict the use of trial de novo, in view
of criticism of its inefficiency. E.g., VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION 389-95 (1949); NATIONAL CoMmITTEE ON LAW OBSERVANCE &
ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 14-15 (1931).
Under the existing commissioners' jurisdiction, recent proposals have likewise
been to limit, not enlarge, the availability of court proceedings. H.R. 6251, 85th Cong.,
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Due to the geographical distribution of the petty offenses covered
by the existing power and the proposed extension, they may, at least
in substantial part, be vested in different commissioners. Congress
could provide for the extension of the new jurisdiction, as in the case of
the old, through designation by the district courts of the commissioners
to be clothed with this authority. If a limited test of the proposal is
preferred, Congress might select specific districts in which the petty
offense authority is most needed, or enumerate specific offenses to
which it may be applied. 2
In the drafting of legislation, it would be appropriate to consider
changing the name "United States commissioner" to "United States
magistrate." The term "magistrate" would dignify the office and
would accord with comparative usage in the states, as does the proposed
broad petty offense jurisdiction. To the public, the present title sug-
gests members of administrative bodies, rather than officers exercising
functions in the judicial sphere. Although it seems desirable that the
appointive power of commissioner-magistrates continue to be vested in
the chief judge of each district, who is acquainted with the qualifications
of members of the local bar, it is suggested that this power be exercised
subject to minimum standards or qualifications established by the
Judicial Conference of the United States.
In keeping with the dignity of their office, the commissioner-
magistrates should receive fixed salaries in lieu of the present
system of fees per case. Congress should abandon the primitive
and archaic practice requiring commissioners to look to fee pay-
ments for the compensation for public services, which it does not
apply to the analogous national park commissioners.129 The disparity
in the volume of work handled by different commissioner-magistrates
can readily be recognized by providing for a permissible salary range
within designated limits. In order that uniform salary policies be
applied, it seems preferable that the determination of individual
salaries be made by the Administrative Office of United States Courts.
1st Sess. (1957), would have raised the maximum jurisdiction of commissioners in
Maryland, who cover the Suitland and Baltimore-Washington Parkways, to offenses
punishable by one year imprisonment or a fine of $1,000 or both. In addition, it
would have entirely removed the offender's right to elect trial in the district court,
leaving only the appeal procedure after trial by commissioner. The bill was approved
by the Judicial Conference. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT
OF TIlE ANNUAL MEETING 27 (1957).
128. The selection of specific districts by Congress is suggested by the approach
of the bill in the previous note. Designation of specific offenses for the commission-
ers' jurisdiction was also essentially done in the same bill (naming traffic offenses),
was proposed by the wording considered in 1943 by the Judicial Conference, see note 57
mtpra, and was part of the original recommendation in the report of the Wickersham
Commission (naming prohibition offenses), see note 47 .sipra.
129. Compare 28 U.S.C. §633 (1952), with 28 U.S.C. §634 (1952).
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Such prosaic details of the proposed extension of the commis-
sioners' authority seem remote from the abstruse constitutional dogma
required to defeat it; but the details of criminal law administration
determine its effectiveness. A similar remoteness separates present
federal petty offense business from the framers' conception of the role
of the national government. The unifying element is the vitality of
the Constitution and the ability of its institutions to accommodate new
responsibilities and tasks, and to articulate the necessary govern-
mental forms. The problem of federal petty offenses should be re-
solved in the same spirit.
